A multilevel approach to the process of concession-making in price negotiations, , in: Die Unternehmung, in: Swiss Journal of Business Research and Practice, 2018(1), pp. 37–53
First offers are powerful anchors that strongly determine the outcome of a negotiation. To gain deeper insights into the power of first offers, we adopt a process-oriented view and analyze the impact of first offers on single subsequent concessions, in simulations of distributive price negotiations between a buyer and a seller. Using a multilevel approach which is new to this field of investigation, the results show that first offers have a significant influence on all subsequent concessions made by the buyer and seller, and these concessions decrease during the course of negotiation. Interestingly, concessions remain unaffected by the opponent’s preceding concession. These results thus demonstrate that the first offer is indeed a powerful anchor, as it influences all single steps required to reach an agreement.
Nagler, H., Wilken, R., De Jong, A., Schmitz, C.
Can outnumbered negotiators succeed? The case of intercultural business negotiations, in: International Business Review, 2017, 26(3), pp. 592–603.
Culture likely affects the choice of negotiation strategies significantly, and culture-dependent preferences for negotiation strategies could lead to conflict when negotiations cross borders. Negotiators often regard some degree of adaptation to the culture of their negotiation partner as a solution to such conflicts. The authors test this suggested solution in an asymmetric setting, in which a solo (outnumbered) negotiator faces a team. Two studies that employ web-based negotiation simulations show that only solo negotiators adapt to the negotiation strategies of their team counterpart. In a third study that uses a symmetric (solo–solo) setting, the adaptation effect disappears. These studies thus illustrate the greater social impact of teams versus solo negotiators. For outnumbered negotiators,
adaptation is particularly beneficial (i.e., increases negotiation profit) if it involves an increased use of integrative strategies. The degree to which negotiators succeed in intercultural negotiations thus depends on their counterpart’s (team’s) culture.
Dinkevych, E., Wilken, R., Aykaç, T., Jacob, F., Prime, N.
Why teams achieve higher negotiation profits than individuals: The mediating role of deceptive tactics, in: Journal of Business and Industrial Marketing, 2016, 32(4), pp. 567–579.
Purpose – This study aims to investigate the use of deceptive negotiation tactics to explain why teams can attain higher negotiation profits than individual negotiators. The study distinguishes deception by commission (i.e. active misrepresentation of preferences) from deception by omission (i.e. passive misrepresentation of preferences). Design/methodology/approach. The sample used to test the mediation hypothesis was made up of data from two electronically mediated negotiation simulations encompassing 75 negotiation dyads with 278 participants. The methodology involved coding deceptive negotiation tactics from the log files by counting utterances related to indifference options that enabled negotiation parties to deceive. Findings – The results show that teams do apply deceptive negotiation tactics more frequently than individual negotiators and that this behavior helps them increase their negotiation profits. Originality/value – The findings are valuable for two reasons. First, the study included controls for other important antecedents of deceptive behavior and negotiation outcome (e.g. negotiators’ nationalities, first bids). Consequently, the empirical results underline the importance of considering team size to understand its impact on profits through the use of deceptive tactics. Second, although this study does show that deception increases negotiation profits, the absolute level of deception is rather small (on average just one deceptive statement per negotiation).
Aykaç, T., Wilken, R., Jacob, F., Prime, N.
Conceptualizing and Measuring the Efficiency of Negotiated Exchanges: A Data Envelopment Analysis Approach, in: The DEA Journal 2(2),2016, pp. 1–34.
Balakrishnan, P.V., Patton, C., Wilken, R.
The ambiguous role of cultural moderators in intercultural business negotiations, in: International Business Review, Vol. 22, No. 4, 2013, pp. 736-753.
Many modern business negotiations cross borders, and one plausible idea for successfully managing such negotiations is to equip negotiation teams with a ‘‘cultural moderator,’’ an individual who has the same cultural background as the business partner. This study investigates the effect of cultural moderators on both the negotiation process (e.g., use of integrative strategies) and economic outcomes (e.g., profit). Using German and French negotiators in an experimental setting, the authors show that a cultural moderator’s influence on the team’s use of integrative strategies depends on the moderator’s degree of collectivism. With respect to economic outcomes, the presence of a cultural moderator always improves a team’s results. Together, these findings suggest that the benefits of using a cultural moderator are not unconditional; rather, they depend on the cultural moderator’s cultural background and on the negotiation goals (process vs. outcome) of the team that employs the moderator.
Wilken, R., Jacob, F., Prime, N.
In How Far Does the Cultural Context Explain Behavior in, and Outcomes Of Intercultural Business Negotiations? SSRN Working Paper, 2010; Wilken R., Fucks S., Jacob F., Prime N.
Steering Sales Reps Through Cost Information An Investigation into the Black Box of Cognitive References and Negotiation Behavior in: SSRN Working Paper, 2009; Wilken R., Cornelissen M., Backhaus K, Schmitz C.; and in: International Journal of Research in Marketing, Vol. 27, No. 1, 2010, pp. 69-82; Wilken R., Cornelissen M., Backhaus K, Schmitz C.
The Impact of Team Characteristics on the Course and Outcome of Intergroup Price Negotiations in: Journal of Business-to-Business Marketing, Vol. 15, No. 4, 2008, pp. 365-396.
Wilken R., Backhaus K., Van Doorn J.
Preisverhandlungen im B2B-Marketing in: Diller, H. (Hrsg.): Pricing-Forschung in Deutschland, Bd. 8 der Buchreihe Marketingforschung aktuell, Wissenschaftliche Gesellschaft für Innovatives Marketing, Nürnberg 2006, S. 1-15; Wilken R., Backhaus K., Van Doorn J., Voeth M., Herbst U.
Erfolgsdeterminanten in der Verhandlungsanalyse – eine systematisierende und kritische Übersicht. Arbeitspapier Nr. 41 des Betriebswirtschaftlichen Instituts für Anlagen und Systemtechnologien, Münster 2005; Wilken R., Backhaus K., Hummelsberger M.
The Dynamic Perspective of Salesperson Performance – A DEA-based Window Analysis Approach. MCM Scientific Discussion Paper Series No. 4, Münster 2005; Wilken R., Backhaus K., Streffer T.